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Abstract—This paper proposes a new obfuscation technique of
a communication protocol that is aimed at making the reverse
engineering of the protocol more complex. The obfuscation
is based on the transformation of protocol message format
specification. The obfuscating transformations are applied to
the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) representation of the messages
and mainly concern the ordering or aggregation of the AST
nodes. The paper also presents the design of a framework that
implements the proposed obfuscation technique by automatically
generating, from the specification of the message format, a
library performing the corresponding transformations. Finally,
our framework is applied to two real application protocols
(Modbus and HTTP) to illustrate the relevance and efficiency
of the proposed approach. Various metrics recorded from the
experiments show the significant increase of the complexity of the
obfuscated protocol binary compared to the non-obfuscated code.
It is also shown that the execution time and memory overheads
remain acceptable for a practical deployment of the approach in
operation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reverse engineering is aimed at extracting knowledge from
a component that is, a priori, complex to understand, in
order to infer its main characteristics and behavior. It is
used for many different purposes, both by legitimate people
or attackers. For instance, attackers motivations could be to
steal intellectual property and generate counterfeit, whereas
legitimate people use reverse engineering to analyze malware
in order to develop protection countermeasures. The target
of the reverse engineering may be for instance a binary
program or a communication protocol. In this paper, we are
mainly concerned by the development of efficient countermea-
sures against malicious protocol reverse engineering activities.
Several complementary solutions are available to fulfill this
objective, such as cryptography or obfuscation. An obfuscation
is a transformation applied on a component (either a software
or a communication protocol) to make the inference of the
transformed component behavior difficult without knowing its
specification. Of course, the transformed component must still
ensure the service for which it was developed. Inevitably, re-
verse engineering and obfuscation activities are closely linked.
This paper focuses on the obfuscation of communication
protocols. Several solutions have been proposed recently,
based e.g., on randomization, mimicry or tunneling techniques
with the objective to make the communication indistinguish-
able from noise or other protocols (see e.g., the discussion of
related work in [1]). Most of these techniques have been devel-
oped in order to circumvent network censorships. However, the
proposed transformations have not been designed to provide
enhanced protection against communication protocols reverse
engineering. Furthermore, the obfuscations are integrated a
posteriori in the binary. They are implemented through a
dedicated function between the transformation layer and the
core application, that can be easily identified by an attacker
to understand the obfuscation logic.
The main objective of this paper is to present a new
protocol obfuscation technique that is aimed at increasing
the effort needed by an adversary, having access to network
traces or to the application binary, to successfully reverse the
protocol. For that purpose, the transformations are applied
to the specification of the protocol, focusing on the message
format. The transformations are, by construction, invertible to
avoid ambiguities when the messages are parsed. We are not
aware of similar obfuscation techniques that operate at the
protocol specification level.
Cryptography could be another solution. Indeed, it guar-
antees several security properties including confidentiality.
Confidentiality does imply protection against protocol reverse
engineering. However, confidentiality is lost if the attacker can
intercept the buffer before encryption in the process memory.
In that case our approach offers some additional protection.
Finding a single buffer with a very specific access pattern
is arguably easier than reversing the code or the message
format produced by our approach. Note that a higher level of
protection can also be obtained by combining both techniques:
e.g., messages can be obfuscated before being encrypted and
sent through the secured communication channel.
To implement our new technique, we developed a frame-
work with the following design characteristics: 1) the frame-
work automatically generates, from the specification of the
message format, a library code performing the transformations,
that can be easily linked to the core application to provide
an obfuscated binary; 2) this library code can be easily re-
generated with new transformations, at regular intervals, to
produce new versions of the obfuscated core application; 3)
the generated code is designed to make the protocol difficult
to reverse for an attacker that would capture network traces
or reverse the binary code of the application itself. One of
the objectives of the framework is to make the interface
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between the transformation layer and the core application
difficult to identify and understand by an attacker. Moreover,
the framework generates obfuscated protocols that behave
according to non regular models which are known to be
difficult to reverse by existing reverse engineering tools.
We applied the proposed obfuscation framework to two
application protocols (Modbus and HTTP). Various metrics
are presented to illustrate the significant increase of the
complexity of the obfuscated protocol binary compared to
the non-obfuscated code. It is also shown that the execution
time and memory overhead remains acceptable for a practical
deployment of the approach in operation.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents
basic background about protocol reverse engineering methods,
associated tools and inference models. It also discusses the
main challenges faced by reverse engineering analysts. Then,
Section III discusses some related work addressing obfuscation
techniques and outlines the main motivations and original
characteristics of our obfuscation techniques. Section IV and
Section V respectively present the architecture of the frame-
work we designed to implement our obfuscation technique and
a detailed description of the main transformations applied to
the message format specification supported by this framework.
Section VI presents and justifies some choices we made for
the implementation of the framework and Section VII presents
the different experiments we have carried out in order to assess
the relevance of our obfuscation technique. Then Section VIII
concludes and outlines some future work.
II. PROTOCOL REVERSE ENGINEERING (PRE)
Reverse engineering is the process of analyzing a subject
system to extract relevant knowledge or design information
about its components, their interrelationships and behavior,
and to create representations of the system based on the
extracted information [2]. Historically, it has initially targeted
hardware products and then its main concepts were applied to
software applications and communication protocols. Software
applications reverse engineering mostly applies to ”closed-
source” programs and usually requires to disassemble the
application binary with tools such as IDA [3] or radare2 [4].
In this paper we focus on communication protocols reverse
engineering (PRE). PRE is the process in which protocol
parameters, format, and semantics are inferred in the absence
of the formal protocol specification [5]. It can be achieved
by focusing either on: the vocabulary (types of messages
which can be exchanged), the message format (encoding
language of message types) or on the protocol grammar
(encoding language of message exchanges). PRE is useful in
many domains such as interoperability, protocol simulation,
security audits or conformance testing. Unfortunately, it is also
useful for attackers to steal intellectual property or to make
counterfeit software. PRE also raised some legal concerns.
These are not discussed in this paper. The remainder of this
section presents: i) the different methods used to perform
communication protocols reverse engineering, ii) some state-of
the art PRE tools, and iii) the associated challenges.
Fig. 1. Protocol reverse engineering steps.
A. PRE methods
In order to reverse engineer a protocol, an analyst needs to
have access either to a network protocol execution trace, or
to the application binary. The analysis of the traces is carried
out by so-called ”network based inference” techniques. Binary
analysis, carried out by so-called ”application based inference”
techniques, focus on the instructions of the binary that parse or
generate messages. It can be done using static code analyses
or dynamic analyses if the binary can be properly executed to
trigger communications.
The reverse engineering activity is divided into several steps.
These steps are quite similar for both network based and
application based inference tools. They are summed up in
figure 1.
The first step, called observation, is aimed at gathering raw
information resulting from the protocol execution. Probes are
placed to collect data the less noisy possible according to the
method used by the reverser. For instance, a network probe
monitors traffic that is fully encapsulated in many protocols
(IP, TCP, etc.). On another side, a probe deployed in the
application, using a debugger, can dump messages without any
noise. If data are noisy, a preprocessing step is required. With
network traces, this preprocessing step consists in removing
the consequences of network protocol encapsulations, using
data sanitization and data aggregation. For instance, some
network traces that have been fragmented by the TCP layer
must be aggregated in order to retrieve messages. The last
step is dedicated to the inference process that begins by
the classification of sanitized messages into different classes,
representing different message types. Finally, either a message
format inference is done on each message class, or a protocol
grammar inference is done on sequences of message types.
This last step is based on language learning algorithms.
B. PRE tools
Various surveys of protocol inference tools are available [6],
[5], [7]. Before 2004, PRE was mainly performed manually.
It was error prone and time consuming. In 2004, PI Project
PRE tool [8], [9] proposed a sequence alignment algorithm
for message classification and message format inference based
on network traces. Shortly afterwards, several tools were
developed using this algorithm while inference algorithms
based on regular languages were used to retrieve the protocol
grammar. For instance, ReverX [10] uses regular language
inference algorithm for both message format inference and
grammar inference. Netzob [11], [12] uses active inference to
guess the message semantics.
The number of application based inference tools is more
important. The main tools are FFE/x86 [13], Dispatcher [14],
[15], [16], Prospex [17] and MACE [18], [19]. FFE/x86
is based on a static analysis of the application to retrieve
messages format as a hierarchical finite state machine. Poly-
glot [20] introduces dynamic binary analysis for message for-
mat inference. This technique was widely used and improved
by following tools. Prospex measures the impact of message
processing on the system to classify the messages and infer
the protocol grammar with classic regular language learning
algorithms. MACE infers the protocol grammar based on a
symbolic execution using a regular model.
Almost all PRE tools rely on regular models to retrieve the
protocol specification (message format and protocol grammar).
In addition, the message classification step is important for a
coherent format inference.
C. Challenges
In the following, we focus on some of the challenges faced
during the protocol reverse engineering process, that we have
considered in our study to guide the selection of proposed
obfuscation approach.
1) Observation: The placement of probes to capture rel-
evant information required for protocol reverse engineering
is critical. When the application uses a cryptographic library,
most of the time, the interface between this library and the
core application is easy to locate and understand. So, it is
still possible through this interface to dump messages using
a debugger and hooks on the interface. Recent work [16],
[21] has introduced techniques to automatically identify the
cryptographic library and to perform PRE on encrypted pro-
tocols. Thus, making the placement of such probes difficult for
a reverser will make the reverse engineering of message format
more complex. This objective can be fulfilled by ensuring
that the code used for the generation of the messages is not
easy to identify by the reverser. Serialization projects naturally
answer to this requirement as they provide an interface based
on accessors (setters and getters) to manipulate data stored in
an internal abstract representation.
2) Fields delimitation: When performing message format
inference, fields delimitation is generally based on a sequence
alignment algorithm and well known delimiters like ’\r\n’,
’\0’ or ’SP’. Thus, the PRE process will be more tedious if
the delimiters are removed. Furthermore, sequence alignment
algorithms are very efficient when applied to messages of the
same types, as these messages have many sub-sequences in
common. If messages of the same type do not fulfill this
property, the classification will be more complex.
3) Classification: Classification in PRE is mainly based on
similarity measures. It is a key step in PRE as the efficiency
of the inference depends on the quality of this classification.
This quality can be degraded if 1) two messages of the same
type seem different or 2) if two messages of different type
seem very close. In the first situation, the number of classes
obtained after the classification exceeds the real number of
message types. In the second situation, the number of classes
is lower compared to the effective number of message types.
With a mix of the two approaches, the classification is likely
to provide meaningless classes.
4) Inference models: To perform message format inference,
most PRE tools rely on regular models (automata, trees, etc),
that are possibly annotated to represent dependencies such as
a field which is the length of another field. Therefore, PRE
tools are likely to be less efficient when the message formats
are not regular. The inference algorithm may not converge, or
it may lead to overfitting (the model accepts a message that
does not belong to the protocol) or underfitting (the model
doesn’t recognize messages that belong to the protocol).
III. OBFUSCATION BACKGROUND
The objective of a program obfuscation is to make it
”unintelligible” while preserving its functionality [22], [23],
[24]. It is implemented by means of a set of transformations
that are used to transform a component P (a software or
a communication protocol) into an equivalent component P’
(providing the same service) such that the behavior of P’ is less
understandable than the behavior of P, without having their
specification. To obfuscate a communication protocol, these
transformations can be applied to the application implementing
the protocol itself, or on the way messages are transmitted.
The chosen transformations must be adapted to the considered
attacker model.
A. Software obfuscations
For software obfuscations, it is commonly assumed that
the attacker has access to the software binary. He can use
static analyzes and possibly dynamic analyzes if he is able to
properly execute the software to trigger communications.
In [25], Collberg et al. propose a taxonomy of obfuscating
transformations for software programs. This taxonomy dis-
tinguishes four transformation targets: 1) layout obfuscation;
2) data obfuscation; 3) control obfuscation and 4) preventive
transformation. In particular, the data obfuscation category,
that is relevant to protocol obfuscation, contains three sub-
categories: 1) Storage & Encoding; 2) Aggregation and 3) Or-
dering. To measure the effect of an obfuscating transformation,
three metrics are defined: 1) potency describing how much a
program is more complex to understand by a human being; 2)
resilience describing how it resists to automatic tool analysis;
and 3) cost assessing the execution time/space penalty which
a transformation incurs on an obfuscated application.
Initially, software obfuscation has focused on hardening
decompilation steps [26], [27], [28], [29]. In [30], Wroblewski
proposed obfuscation transformations specific to binary code
instead of transformations that apply to higher level languages.
In [31], Linn and Debray introduce the replacement of direct
calls by so-called branching functions. This work is extended
in [32] by Cappaert and Preneel. They formalize the notion of
control flow graph flattening to prevent information leakage.
Recently, some solutions have been proposed to mitigate
dynamic analysis. As an example, software diversification is
applied in [33] to increase the complexity of dynamic analysis.
Most of dynamic analyses are based on data tainting [34], thus
in [35], transformations are proposed to increase the risk of
obtaining a wrong taint analysis.
B. Communication protocol obfuscations
For communication protocol obfuscations, the frequently
considered adversary model is an attacker who can eavesdrop
a communication channel to collect transmitted data, without
having access to the binary of the application.
Many obfuscation techniques have been proposed to mit-
igate network censorships. In [1], four categories are dis-
tinguished to classify protocol obfuscations: Randomization,
Mimicry, Tunneling/Covert Channel and Programmable. This
classification differs from the one in [25] by Collberg et
al. which considers transformations that must be integrated
into the design process of the application while Dyer et
al. classification considers transformations applied after the
application development.
1) Randomization: The goal of Randomization is to trans-
form a message sequence into a network traffic seemingly
random. This transformation must prevent fingerprinting and
any inference of any statistical characteristics of the protocol.
The main projects dealing with obfuscation by randomiza-
tion are used in Tor as Pluggable Transports plugins1, e.g.
ScrambleSuit [36], obfproxy [37]. These projects modify the
application layer encoding and some part of the transport
layer (connection characteristics) that are often used in firewall
rules. These techniques are very effective against firewalls
based on blacklists.
2) Mimicry: The goal of Mimicry is to change the com-
munication characteristics (notably, message format) to mimic
characteristics of other legitimate protocols, e.g. Skype or
HTTP.
With this technique, firewalls based on whitelists of au-
thorized protocols can be pypassed. As an example, Ste-
goTorus [38] project embeds information into the headers
and body of a set of predefined HTTP messages, using
steganographic techniques. SkypeMorph [39] uses the facts
that Skype traffic is encrypted and focuses on mimicry of
statistical characteristics of a Skype communication. However,
both of these approaches can be distinguished from legitimate
protocols using semantics, dependencies between connections
and error connections [40]. Furthermore, mimicry incurs a
higher overhead (time and memory usage) compared to ran-
domization.
3) Tunneling/Covert Channel: The goal of Tunneling is
to use a legitimate layer protocol as a new transport layer
protocol. The tunneling strategy can be integrated in an ap-
plication using a library implementing the legitimate protocol.
Thus, the observed behavior corresponds to the behavior of
a legitimate application which uses the legitimate protocol.
However, the overhead of this solution is higher compared to
Mimicry. Skype has been widely used for this purpose in
the Freewave [41] and Facet [42] projects. In [43], a solution
1https://www.torproject.org/docs/pluggable-transports
based on online videogames communications is proposed to
reduce the overhead. Their solution is also easily adaptable to
different online videogame protocols.
4) Programmable: The goal of this technique is to combine
benefits of both Randomization and Mimicry by allowing
the system to be configured to accommodate either strategy.
FTE [44] project is categorized as a programmable system
by the authors because the obfuscation techniques are pa-
rameterized by the user with a regular expression. How-
ever, it only considers message format. Thus, they developed
Marionette [1] to take into account communication channel
properties.
5) Cryptography: Cryptography is a specific type of Ran-
domization that also ensures security properties: privacy and
integrity. Encrypted traffic is difficult to process by the re-
verser, the resilience metric is therefore very high for this
category. On the other hand, this category is cumbersome and
costly. It often requires the use of keys that have to be dis-
tributed, managed and revoked, and the use of a cryptographic
algorithm that is costly at runtime. Moreover, one can question
the robustness of these techniques if the attacker model is
extended by considering that attacker also has a copy of the
application binary. Indeed, tools such as Dispatcher [16] and
Reformat [21] have shown their efficiency in identifying the
interface between the cryptographic functions and the core of
the application. A debugger placed at this interface can then
dump the plain messages, thus, bypassing the cryptographic
algorithms.
C. Discussion and contribution
As pointed out by Dyer et al. in [1], most existing pro-
tocol obfuscation techniques have been developed in order
to circumvent network censorships. These techniques were
not designed to provide efficient protection against protocol
reverse engineering. Indeed, they can be easily bypassed
especially when the attackers have access to a network trace
and to the binary of the application.
Usually, the obfuscation transformations are integrated into
the binary and are applied a posteriori. Accordingly, the
reverse engineering process can be facilitated if probes can be
successfully placed by the adversary at the interface between
the core application and the transformation layer.
As far as we know, none of the state-of-the art techniques
have investigated the possibility to obfuscate the specification
of the communication protocol to provide protection against
protocol reverse engineering. The main contribution of this
paper consists in defining and implementing a framework for
communication protocols obfuscation based on such approach,
considering transformations that are applied to the specifi-
cation of the format of the messages. The transformations
are, by construction, invertible to avoid ambiguities while
parsing a message. Also, the definition of the transformations
is guided by the reverse engineering challenges discussed
in Section II-C, to make the reverse engineering process
more cumbersome and complex. In particular the following
observations are taken into account in our approach:
Fig. 2. Architecture of the framework ProtoObf.
• Inference algorithms used by PRE tools to retrieve the
protocol grammar or the message format rely on a clas-
sification of messages. An obfuscation that could lead to
a bad classification will likely affect the efficiency of the
reverse engineering activity.
• The specification of communication protocols is generally
based on regular models (automata, tree, etc.) that are
simple to implement and for which messages can be
parsed and generated quickly. Naturally, PRE tools usu-
ally adopt similar models to infer the protocols messages
format or grammar. These tools are likely to be inefficient
if more complex models are used to generate the obfus-
cated messages (e.g., pushdown automata, context-free
grammar, etc.) without sacrificing processing time [45].
• The development, debug and maintenance of obfuscated
protocols should not result in significant overheads to
the users, thus, building a message should use the same
interface, even in presence of obfuscations.
The obfuscation framework presented in the remaining
sections is aimed at fulfilling these requirements. In this paper
we only address the obfuscation of the protocol message
format. The following advantages of our approach can be
highlighted: 1) operating at the protocol specification level
allows the definition of transformations that are aware of
the semantics of the message fields (in other words, the
transformations are coherent with respect to the organization
of the message); 2) transformations are generated using non-
regular languages (e.g., context-free language such as anbn or
context sensitive language such as the copy language) to make
the syntax of protocol messages appear more complex than the
syntax of regular languages; 3) obfuscated messages are more
complex to infer with acceptable parsing and processing time;
4) our approach is integrated directly into the development
process of the application. The core application doesn’t build
the non-obfuscated message to send. The obfuscated message
is directly constructed when it is serialized. This strategy
complicates the work of reverse engineering tools even if the
attacker has access to the binary of the application; 5) our
approach is orthogonal to existing solutions, thus can be used
in conjunction with them.
IV. ARCHITECTURE
The architecture of our framework, named ProtoObf, is
presented in figure 2. The input of the framework is the
message format specification of the protocol (noted S in the
following). This specification is translated into a graphical
representation named a message format graph and noted G1
in the following.
According to criteria established by the developer, the
framework selects a number n of transformations to be ap-
plied to G1. These transformations are either aggregation
transformations or ordering transformations according to the
taxonomy defined in [25]. Each of the transformations noted
τi takes a graph Gi as an input and provides a modified
graph Gi+1 as an output. The chosen transformations are
composed and applied to the initial graph G1. Note that all
the transformations must be invertible so that the receiver is
able to inverse the transformation.
The framework is used during the design and the develop-
ment of the application to generate the source code that will
perform the obfuscation or deobfuscation of messages during
the execution of the application, based on Gn+1. Therefore,
the output of the framework is the source code for the message
parser and the corresponding message serializer. These source
codes must be integrated within all the applications that
communicate, so that they use the same obfuscations.
During the execution, the message serializer analyzes an
abstract syntax tree (AST) of a message, which is an instanti-
ation of G1 (i.e., it belongs to the language generated by G1).
This AST is serialized by performing transformations on the
fly while constructing the obfuscated message.
Let us note that the graph is an abstraction of the format of
the messages and does not contain the values of the message
fields. These values are defined in each AST corresponding to
the instantiation of the graph for a specific message.
V. MODELS AND TRANSFORMATIONS
This section first presents the different models we adopted
for the formalization of the message format of the protocol
as well as the obfuscations of the messages. Then, detailed
information is provided for the proposed elementary obfusca-
tions chosen in our approach. Finally, the main principles of
the serializer and parser behavior are presented.
A. Message format graph
This section provides more details on the abstract syntax
tree of messages and on the associated message format graph.
These models are illustrated, in figure 3, with a simplified
example.
An AST is structured as a tree containing nodes and edges.
A leaf of this tree represents a value of a message field. The
overall message corresponds to the concatenation of these
values using an ordered depth-first search. The intermediate
nodes of the AST describe the message structure. Figure 3
presents an example of two types of messages derived from the
Modbus protocol, denoted as M1 and M2, with the associated
Fig. 3. Message format graph and abstract syntax trees.
abstract syntax trees, AST1 and AST2, and the corresponding
sequence of bytes.
A message format graph G1 describes all AST that are
compliant to the specification of S. A node of the graph
describes a node in the corresponding AST. In figure 3, the
graph G1 describes both AST1 and AST2.
A node is defined by five attributes: 1) a Name; 2) a Type; 3)
a list of sub-nodes named SubNodes; 4) a parent node named
Parent (none for the root node) and 5) a boundary method
named Boundary. The Type or the Boundary attributes may
contain an implicit reference to another node.
The type of a node can be:
• Terminal if the node of the AST contains user data or
message related information, e.g. the size of another node;
• Sequence if the node of the AST contains a sequence of
sub-nodes;
• Optional if the node of the AST is optional, depending
on the value of another node in the AST;
• Repetition if the node of the AST consists of a repetition
of the same sub-node;
• Tabular if the node of the AST consists of a repetition of
its sub-node, and the number of repetitions is given by
another node in the AST.
The Boundary attribute indicates the method used to define
the length of the associated field. It can be:
• Fixed if it has a fixed size defined in S;
• Delimited if it ends with a predefined byte or sequence
of bytes (for instance \r\n in HTTP);
• Length if the length of the field is defined by another
node;
• Counter if the node is a Tabular, the number of repetitions
of the sub-node in the AST is defined by another node;
• End if the field corresponds to the remaining of the
message;
• Delegated if the length of the field corresponds to the
sum of the length of the sub-nodes.
The Boundary attribute must be consistent with the type of
the field. For instance, a Terminal field must be delimited
either with a Fixed boundary, a Delimited boundary, a Length
boundary or an End boundary.
This graph is well suited to describe classical protocols that
rely on regular models in language theory: Optional type can
be used to represent the ”|” operator; Sequence type is used
for the concatenation ”.”; and Tabular and Repetition types
can be used to represent closure ”∗”.
In the representation of such graph in the figure 3, nodes
are represented by their name. The type of node for Terminal,
Sequence, Tabular and Optional fields is specified under the
node by using notation Te, S, Ta and O. Boundaries are shown
for Delimited, Delegated and End by the notation De, Dgt and
E, for Fixed by the notation F(n) (n stands for the fixed size),
and for Counter and Length by the notations C(n) and L(n)
(where n stands for the node that helps to define the size,
identified with a dashed arrow in the figure).
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF GENERIC TRANSFORMATIONS
SplitAdd
A Terminal node with a value v is split into a sequence of two sub-
nodes with values v1, v2: v = v1 + v2.
SplitSub and SplitXor
Same as SplitAdd with a subtraction or a xor.
SplitCat
A Terminal node with a value v is split into a sequence of two sub-
nodes with values v1, v2: v = concatenate(v1, v2).
ConstAdd
A Terminal node with a value v is substituted by a node with value
v + constant (constant is predefined in the framework).
ConstSub and ConstXor
Same as ConstAdd with a subtraction or a xor.
BoundaryChange
A Delimited Boundary is changed into a Length Boundary: the node
is replaced by a sequence of two-nodes n1, n2 (n1 is the length of
n2).
PadInsert
A node with random value is added to a Sequence.
ReadFromEnd
A node is read from the end, from right to left.
TabSplit
A Tabular with n sub-nodes is replaced by a sequence of Tabular
nodes.
RepSplit
Same as TabSplit with a Repetition.
ChildMove
Permutation of two sub-nodes of a Sequence.
B. Transformations
A transformation, noted τi, modifies the structure of a mes-
sage format graph that leads to a modification of the abstract
syntax tree of the messages processed during the execution.
Thus, it also leads to a change of the message serializer
and the message parser behavior. The transformation must be
invertible by design to allow the receiver to correctly parse the
obfuscated message. The proposed framework is designed to
be applied to a large set of message format graphs. Thus, we
have defined a set of generic transformations that are presented
in table I. They include ordering transformations such as
ChildMove and TabSplit and some aggregation transformations
such as SplitCat and ConstAdd. This set can be extended with
new generic transformations.
A generic transformation T is a function that consists in
changing a graph pattern a into a graph pattern b, associated
to some applicability constraints. If the graph Gi being obfus-
cated by the framework contains the graph pattern a and if Gi
complies with the constraints of T , then the transformation τi
can be derived and the graph Gi+1 is obtained by replacing the
instantiated graph pattern a by the instantiated graph pattern
b (with a renaming of nodes if needed).
The proposed transformations do not remove any infor-
mation; they can only modify the value or the order of the
different fields of the message. These transformations are
easily inverted. In other words, we have τ -1i ◦τi = id. The main
difficulty lies in the composition of the message parser and the
message serializer with the transformations. Therefore, these
transformations are constrained to ensure that the composition
of the message parser and the message serializer leads to the
TABLE II
DESCRIPTION FORMAT OF GENERIC TRANSFORMATIONS
SplitAdd
Serialization pseudocode ↓
Choose a random value X1
Compute X2 = X +X1
Constraints
Boundary of parent nodes must
be either Delegated or End
Challenge
Inference models and classification: more dependencies between
fields in message and various representations of the same message
BoundaryChange
Serialization pseudocode ↑
Measure the serialization of X
Prefix the result with this length
Constraints
Boundary of parent nodes must
be either Delegated or End
Challenge
Fields delimitation: delimitation with a length field
ReadFromEnd
Serialization pseudocode ↑
Mirror the serialization of X
Constraints
Boundary of parent nodes can
be anything but Delimited
Challenge
Inference models and classification: subpart of message read
in reverse order
TabSplit
Serialization pseudocode ↓
Map fst and snd on X
Create the sequence
Constraints
Boundary of parent nodes can
be anything but Delimited and
Boundary of X must be
Delegated
Challenge
Inference models: turn a regular language (AB)∗ into
a context-free language AmBm
ChildMove
Serialization pseudocode ↓
Switch children in X
Constraints
Boundary of parent nodes can
be anything but Delimited and
no nodes inside B must depend
on a node inside A
Challenge
Classification: meaningful fields are no more at the beginning
identity.
The framework memorizes, for each applied transformation
τi, the node in the graph that corresponds to the graph pattern
a. Accordingly, it is able to correctly derive the message
serializer and the message parser, taking into account the
transformations. Some transformations may change the values
of the fields that are needed to correctly serialize (or parse)
the remaining of the AST (or of the message), for instance
a length field. As a result, the strategy adopted is to process
transformations on the fly. The message serializer uses a depth
first search on the AST and the transformations are executed
during this graph traversal (same for the message parser).
Each generic transformation can be formatted as presented
in Table II. This table illustrates the more interesting generic
transformations from Table I. Other transformations are small
variation (for instance SplitSub, etc.). For the generic trans-
formations of figure II, the graph at the left hand side of
the ⇒ symbol corresponds to pattern a and the one at the
right hand side corresponds to the result of the transformation
(pattern b). The serialization pseudocode is generated by the
framework to perform the transformation on the fly. The
vertical arrow indicates if this transformation is performed
before serializing the children (down arrow), or on the result of
the serialization (up arrow). The constraints correspond to the
attributes to check on the node of the pattern, the sub-nodes
and parent nodes. The last information indicated in the table
is the protocol reverse challenge that is emphasized by each
transformation. These challenges are presented in section II-C.
Table II shows that most of the challenges are covered by
one of these generic transformations. The SplitTab and the
ReadFromEnd transformations change a regular language, that
is compatible with most of reverse engineering tools, into a
language that does not fit models traditionally supported by
these tools (for instance, context-free language as anbn). In
particular, the ReadFromEnd encodes a message from right to
left. This practice is unusual and makes the inference of links
between fields very difficult. The delimitation of fields that is
easier in presence of Delimited node, is more difficult with
Length node and the BoundaryChange change from the first
towards the second. In addition, this generic transformation is
also useful to circumvent some constraints of other generic
transformations. The classification is also made more difficult
with generic transformations like SplitAdd that can be applied
on message keywords which are often used to decide classi-
fication. The only challenge that is not addressed directly by
generic transformation is the Observation. This challenge is
addressed in the implementation of the framework, presented
in section VI.
C. Serializer and parser behavior
As soon as the message serializer starts the serialization of
a node, it inspects the list of transformations to find out if one
transformation needs to be applied before serializing the node.
If so, this transformation is executed on the current node of
the AST. Then the message serializer processes the node and
the node with its sub-tree is replaced by a node containing
the result of the serialization. At the end of this processing,
the serializer inspects again the list of transformations to
know if a transformation must also be applied at the end of
the serialization of the node. If so, this transformation is in
turn applied. The parser works in the same way. However,
the parser has to face an additional challenge: to rebuild a
sub-node of AST from the message, it must first delimit the
corresponding sub-part in the message.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
The framework is implemented using the C language.
Lex and Yacc tools are used to parse the message format
specification and generate the message format graph. The
structure that represents a message format graph is simply
a transcription in the C language of the attributes presented
in section V-A. Then, each node of the graph is analyzed to
identify compatible generic transformations. A transformation
is randomly chosen among them and applied to the node. This
routine is applied as many times as indicated by a parameter
specified in the framework. Finally, a depth-first search al-
gorithm is executed on the resulting message format graph to
generate the source code. Generic transformations presented in
the previous section cover all reverse engineering challenges
except the Observation challenge. This last challenge is taken
into account during the generation of the code source used
to manipulate, parse and serialize an AST. In the following,
we provide more information on the structure used to store
the AST and the functions generated by the framework that
the core application can use to instantiate this AST (i.e., the
accessors of the AST).
First, let us consider a naive implementation that consists
in instantiating an non-obfuscated AST, during the execution
of the core application, and then, in applying the selected
transformations to the complete non-obfuscated AST to gen-
erate the obfuscated AST which is then serialized. With such
approach, the entire non-obfuscated AST and obfuscated AST
are available in the memory during the execution and a
unique function is used to obfuscate the first AST. Therefore
it is easy to locate this function in the memory to recover
the non-obfuscated AST. Obfuscation techniques that process
the binary usually obfuscate the code and the internal data.
However, the AST is designed to generate a message that will
be sent through the network and these obfuscation techniques
ignore these data (in fact, they must not modify the format of
message sent in the network).
Our framework focuses on the message format specification.
It can obfuscate an intermediate representation of the AST
that does not correspond neither to the entire non-obfuscated
AST nor to the entire obfuscated AST. In the framework,
this intermediate representation corresponds to the AST after
the application of aggregation transformations and before the
application of ordering transformations. When the core appli-
cation decides to send a message, it generates this temporary
AST through a set of setter functions. These setter functions
perform aggregation transformations on the fly. When the
AST is complete, ordering transformations are applied while
serializing this message. Hence, the serialization is spread into
multiple function calls.
The code source generated by the framework provides
the prototypes of the message parser and serializer, plus the
accessors (setters and getters) and the structures for the in-
termediate AST. Getters and setters are functions that retrieve
or store a value in a field while performing the aggregation
transformations, on-the-fly. To make them harder to identify,
they can be implemented as macro, and thus inlined in the
code. This interface must be stable regardless of the chosen
transformations. Accordingly, the set of transformations can
be easily replaced by another set of transformations without
changing the core application. From a practical point of view,
this interface is directly obtained from the non-obfuscated
specification of the message format. Accessors will hide the
complexity implied by aggregating transformations while the
code of the parser and serializer hide the complexity implied
by the ordering transformations.
VII. EXPERIMENTATIONS
To evaluate our framework, we have implemented the speci-
fication of two protocols: a binary protocol, TCP-Modbus [46],
and a text-protocol HTTP [47]. Modbus contains a Tabular
field, a Length Boundary and a Counter Boundary, while
HTTP contains an Optional field, a Repetitive field, as well
as Delimited Boundary. For Modbus protocol, we have also
developed a core application that generates the messages 1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 15 and 16 and their response, as required by
simply modbus2 client implementation. This set of messages
includes all the different formats of Modbus messages. For
HTTP protocol, we have also developed a simplified core
application. However, this implementation doesn’t create mes-
sages with consistent values for the keywords. We consider this
verification to be relevant to the server code, not to the parser
code.
A. Experiments
In order to analyze the impact of the framework, several
experiments are carried out with a different number of ob-
fuscations (0 to 4) per field, i.e., per node of the graph. For
each experiment, the transformations are selected randomly
among the set of applicable generic transformations and the
code source of the parser and serializer is generated. The
core application is compiled with this code source. Then,
it is executed to generate different messages with random
values. The source code used to initialize the message and
invoke the serialization process and the parsing process is
the same for all experiments. This validates our new concept
of protocol transformations created at the compilation time:
the code that uses the protocol is simple and independent of
applied transformations.
The results presented in the following subsections for HTTP
and Modbus correspond to 5000 experiments each (1000 for
each obfuscation scenario, from 0 to 4).
B. Measures
During the experiments, different measures were collected.
The time required for the code source generation (i.e., the
parsing of the specification, the application of transformations
2http://www.simplymodbus.ca
and the code generation) is called Generation time. This
number must be low to allow the developer to easily adjust
the number of desired transformations.
The maximum number of obfuscations per node and the
total number of applied transformations on the graph are
memorized. Multiple experiments with the same number of
transformations per node may lead to different numbers of
effectively applied transformations on the graph. Indeed, ac-
cording to the transformations applied (which are randomly
chosen), the number of obfuscations may be different because
some transformations may create new nodes whereas others do
not create any. Also, some randomly selected transformations
may not be applicable if the associated constraints are not
satisfied. So, we compute the average, min and max for this
last metric.
The complexity of the generated code, i.e. the potency
of the obfuscations, is also considered in the experiments.
The number of code lines is the amount of code generated
by the framework for the complete protocol specification. It
contains code for serializer, parser and accessors functions,
the internal structures and sanity checks, i.e. the complete
serialization library. Let us recall that the main objective
of our approach is to make the reverse engineering of the
obfuscated protocol significantly more difficult for the attacker
than without obfuscation. The increase of the complexity can
be reflected e.g., by a higher number of the lines of code or of
the number of internal structures used in the library to store
data during the parsing process.
The cflow tool is used to extract the call graph for the
parsing process. This graph reflects the complexity of function
invocations in the code. We retrieve the size of this graph (the
number of nodes) and its depth.
Finally, we have evaluated the cost of our solution by
measuring the time required to serialize and parse a message,
and the space overhead associated to the serialized message
size (through the evaluation of the buffer size).
C. Results
Results are summarized for each considered protocol in
Tables III, IV, respectively. Three values are indicated, with the
following syntax: average, [min, max]. The results reported for
the potency metrics are normalized by the values associated
to the non-obfuscated version. The cost metrics are provided
in absolute values.
For the simple case where at most one obfuscation is applied
per node (which nevertheless corresponds to an average of
10.1 applied transformations on the HTTP graph and 47.8
applied transformations on the Modbus graph), the complexity
of the generated code is about twice the complexity of the
code without obfuscation. In particular, the increase in the
number of structures reflects a significant difference between
the initial specification and the result of the transformation. For
the other obfuscation cases, these metrics increase as expected.
The highest increase is observed for the call graph size.
To have better insights on the impact of obfuscations, Fig-
ures 6 and 7 plot the evolution of the potency metrics relative
Fig. 4. HTTP: Parsing and serialization time
increase compared to the non-obfuscated case, according to
the number of obfuscations applied on the graph. Generally,
we observe a linear increasing trend of the number of lines,
the number of structures and the size of the call graph. The
increase of the call graph depth and of the buffer size is slower
and tend to stabilize. The increase of buffer size is kept very
low which is very important especially for application contexts
where network packet resources are usually more crucial than
application execution time.
The cost of the obfuscations is illustrated in figures 4 and 5
which present the evolution of the parsing and serialization
times according to the number of transformations applied
on the graph. The straight lines report the result of the
linear regression between these times and this number of
transformations (the correlation coefficient is also indicated).
These figures show that inevitably the processing time in the
presence of transformations increases. However, this increase
is linear with the number of transformations applied and
the slope is smooth. This indicates that the overhead due to
these transformations is not important and could be reduced
with a more optimized implementation of the framework.
Note that these results are achieved with a high number of
transformations. A developer may consider it sufficient to
make only a limited number of transformations. It is also
noteworthy that in all the experiments that we have carried
out, the parsing and serialization times did not exceed 0.5 ms
for Modbus and 2.8 ms for HTTP. The average values are
significantly lower.
Finally, as regards the cost of our obfuscation framework
associated to the generation of the obfuscated code, it remains
low. Indeed, the generation time is kept under 4 ms in the worst
case. This worst case corresponds to a succession of SplitOp
obfuscations applied on a large data field. It is noteworthy that
the overhead associated to the generation of the obfuscated
code is less critical as this operation is performed offline.
D. Resilience Assessment
To analyse the resilience of our framework, we asked an
expert of (and a contributor to) Netzob [12], a popular protocol
reverse engineering tool based on network trace analysis, to
perform PRE. We have sent to him a network trace containing
Fig. 5. Modbus: Parsing and serialization time
Fig. 6. HTTP: normalizes potency metrics
Fig. 7. Modbus: normalized potency metrics
4 different messages and their corresponding answers of Mod-
bus protocol. In less than half an hour, he was able to retrieve
the exact format of the messages for the non-obfuscated pro-
tocol. For a version generated with one obfuscation per field,
he was not able to obtain any relevant results after more than
two hours of work. He confirmed that the obfuscated code was
more difficult to analyze with classic PRE tools. Of course, this
assessment is not sufficient, and more significant experiments
are needed to validate the resilience of the framework. It is
noteworthy that such experiments are not easy to perform as
they require the contribution of independent protocol reverse
TABLE III
A COMPARATIVE RESULTS FOR HTTP PROTOCOL
Nb. transf. per node 1 2 3 4
Nb. transf. applied 10[9; 11] 22[19; 26] 39[33; 47] 59[50; 76]
Potency (normalized)
Nb. lines 1.7[1.6; 2.0] 2.7[2.2; 3.5] 4.0[3.2; 5.2] 5.6[4.3; 7.5]
Nb. structs 1.8[1.7; 2.1] 2.9[2.4; 3.6] 4.3[3.5; 5.4] 5.9[4.7; 7.8]
Call graph size 2.2[2.0; 2.6] 3.7[3.0; 4.7] 5.6[4.5; 7.2] 7.9[6.1; 10.5]
Call graph depth 2.0[2.0; 2.0] 3.2[3.1; 3.3] 4.0[3.9; 4.0] 5.5[5.4; 5.6]
Costs (absolute)
Generation time (ms) 2.10[1.92; 2.41] 3.17[2.59; 4.03] 4.80[3.84; 6.36] 8.93[5.41; 26.08]
Parsing time (ms) 0.06[0.04; 0.12] 0.15[0.08; 0.47] 0.37[0.22; 1.00] 0.79[0.47; 2.80]
Serialization time (ms) 0.04[0.02; 0.10] 0.10[0.05; 0.34] 0.22[0.13; 0.75] 0.43[0.25; 1.57]
Buffer size (bytes) 137[95; 244] 154[101; 284] 181[112; 297] 219[119; 404]
TABLE IV
A COMPARATIVE RESULTS FOR TCP-MODBUS PROTOCOL
Nb. transf. per node 1 2 3 4
Nb. transf. applied 47[45; 51] 107[101; 112] 184[167; 200] 279[258; 310]
Potency (normalized)
Nb. lines 1.9[1.8; 2.0] 3.0[2.8; 3.2] 4.5[4.1; 4.9] 6.4[5.7; 7.1]
Nb. structs 1.9[1.8; 1.9] 2.9[2.7; 3.1] 4.3[3.9; 4.7] 6.0[5.4; 6.6]
Call graph size 2.6[2.1; 3.2] 4.3[3.4; 5.5] 6.8[4.7; 8.6] 9.8[6.8; 12.2]
Call graph depth 2.0[2.0; 2.0] 2.5[2.5; 2.5] 3.3[3.3; 3.3] 3.8[3.8; 3.8]
Costs (absolute)
Generation time (ms) 6.39[5.97; 6.72] 12.53[9.66; 31.06] 16.34[14.56; 17.74] 24.29[21.76; 27.01]
Parsing time (ms) 0.01[0.00; 0.06] 0.03[0.01; 0.14] 0.05[0.01; 0.25] 0.09[0.02; 0.52]
Serialization time (ms) 0.01[0.00; 0.06] 0.02[0.00; 0.10] 0.03[0.01; 0.16] 0.05[0.01; 0.31]
Buffer size (bytes) 30[3; 195] 33[3; 293] 38[3; 381] 42[3; 478]
engineering experts and to have an easy access to automatic
PRE tools which is not the case today.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a novel protocol obfuscation frame-
work that is aimed at increasing the effort needed by an
adversary to successfully reverse the protocol. The main
contribution consists in obfuscating the specification of the
messages format. The specification is formalized as a graph
on which generic transformations are automatically applied to
generate a library code that can be easily linked to the core
application. The obfuscated messages are scattered throughout
the memory so that it is difficult for the reverser to easily
reconstruct the message. A proof of concept prototype of the
framework is implemented and a set of experiments are carried
out on two protocols to illustrate the feasibility of the proposed
approach and evaluate its impact on the complexity of the
generated code and its overhead. The results show a significant
increase of the complexity of the obfuscated protocol binary
compared to the non-obfuscated code. It is also shown that the
execution time and memory overhead remains acceptable for
a practical deployment of the approach in operation.
Our approach can be applied to any protocol for which the
specification of the messages can be represented according the
proposed message format graph. We believe that this can be
easily achieved for most common protocols, including binary
and text protocols. The proposed framework also provides
the opportunity to enhance the protection of the considered
protocol as new obfuscated versions of the protocol can be
easily generated. The deployment of new versions, at regular
intervals, should decrease the likelihood that the protocol can
be successfully reversed and compromised.
It is noteworthy that the proposed framework is designed
to resist to attacks aimed at reverse engineering the protocol,
rather than extracting partial information concerning e.g.,
specific data fields or keywords. Cryptographic techniques are
more suitable in this latter case.
Several extensions of this work can be investigated. In
particular, in the current implementation the obfuscations
are selected randomly. A more efficient approach could be
defined by taking into account the grammar of the protocol.
Another open question concerns the definition of the number
of obfuscations needed to achieve an acceptable level of
resilience of the protocol against reverse engineering attacks.
Finally, a more significant validation of the proposed approach
needs to be carried out, using e.g. different automated reverse
engineering tools and independent experts. Such evaluation is
not easy to achieve.
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